Friday, January 13, 2006

ALITO: youngstown and wiretapping

SPECTER: You made a speech at Pepperdine where you said, in commenting about the decision of the Supreme Court in ex parte Milligan, that, quote, "the Constitution applies even in an extreme emergency." The government made a, quote, "broad and unwise argument that the Bill of Rights simply don't apply during wartime."

Do you stand by that statement?

ALITO: I certainly do, Senator.

The Bill of Rights applies at all times. And it's particularly important that we adhere to the Bill of Rights in times of war and in times of national crisis, because that's when there's the greatest temptation to depart from them.

SPECTER: Steering clear, Judge Alito, of asking you how you would decide a specific case, I think it is very important to find out your jurisprudential approach in interpreting whether the September 14th, 2001 congressional resolution authorizing the use of force constituted congressional authorization for the National Security Agency to engage in electronic surveillance where one party to the conversation was in the United States.

Let me take just a moment to lay out the factual and legal considerations.

The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 provides, quote, "It shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance shall be conducted in the interpretation of domestic, wire, oral and electronic communications may be conducted."

The government contends that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act clause, quote, "Except as authorized by statute, opens the door to interpreting that resolution to authorize the surveillance."

Let me give you a series of questions. I don't like to put more than one on the table at a time, but I think they're necessary in this situation to give the structure as to where I'm going.

First, in interpreting whether Congress intended to amend FISA by that resolution, would it be relevant that Attorney General Gonzales said, we were advised that, quote, "That was not something we could likely get," close quote?

Second, if Congress had intended to amend FISA by the resolution, wouldn't Congress have specifically said so, as Congress did in passing the Patriot Act, giving the executive greater flexibility in using roving wiretaps?

SPECTER: Third, in interpreting statutory construction on whether Congress intended to amend FISA by the resolution, what would the relevance be of rules of statutory construction that repeal or change by implication that changes by, or makes a repeal, by implication or disfavor and specific statutory language trumps more general pronouncements?

How would you weigh and evaluate the president's war powers under Article II to engage in electronic surveillance with the warrant required by congressional authority under Article I in legislating under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act?

And let me start with the with the broader principles. In approaching an issue as to whether the president would have Article II powers, inherent constitutional authority to conduct electronic surveillance without a wiretap (sic) when you have the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act on the books making that the exclusive means, what factors would you weigh in that format?

ALITO: Well, probably the first consideration would be to evaluate the statutory question. And you outlined some of the factors and the issues that would arise in interpreting the statute, what is meant by the provision of FISA that you quoted regarding FISA, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, being the exclusive means for conducting surveillance.

ALITO: And then, depending on how one worked through that statutory question, then I think one might look to Justice Jackson's framework. And he said that he divided cases in this area into three categories: where the president acts with explicit or implicit congressional approval; where the president acts and Congress has not expressed its view on the matter one way or the other; and the final category, where the president exercises executive power and Congress -- and that is in the face of an explicit or implicit congressional opposition to it.

And depending on how one works through the statutory issue, then the case might fall into one of those three areas.

But these questions that you pose are obviously very difficult and important and complicated questions that are quite likely to arise in litigation perhaps before my own court or before the Supreme Court.


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